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ESSAYS
STATE-CENTERED REFUGEE LAW: FROM
RESETTLEMENT TO CONTAINMENT
by T Alexander Aleinikoff *
In a world that abhors the presence of unadministered spaces or people,
the presence of forced migrants must be treated as abnormal. Govern-
ment authorities invariably react to refugee situations by trying first to
contain them and later to eliminate them.1
[R]efugee law as it exists today is fundamentally concerned with the pro-
tection of powerful states.2
The concept of refugee both reflects and problematizes the modem
construction of an international system of states. That system is pre-
mised upon an understanding of the world as divided into legally
equal, sovereign states, where sovereignty is taken to mean the legal
right to govern demarked portions of the territory of the globe. In
such a world, individuals need to belong to a state both to ensure their
protection and acquisition of rights and to permit the system of states
to ascertain which particular state has responsibility for (or control
over) which persons. 3 In short, the modem world operates under the
motto of a state for everyone and everyone in a state.4
The idea of a system of states does not entail closed borders or
immutable memberships. States may work out rules for the transna-
tional movement of persons, the protection of citizens of one state in
another state, and even the transfer of loyalties from one state to an-
other. Indeed, these kinds of practices-issues of immigration and
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School; Swarthmore College, B.A. (1974),
Yale Law School, J.D. (1977). This essay is drawn from a paper prepared for a conference on
"Trust and the Refugee Experience," sponsored by the UN University/World Institute for De-
velopment Economics Research in Bergen, Norway (June 1992), and will be published in TRUST
AND THE REFUGEE EXPERIENCE (E. Valentine Daniel & John Chr. Knudsen eds., forthcoming
1993). I would like to thank the participants for comments. Howard Adelman, Jose Alvarez,
Deborah Anker, James Hathaway, Debra Livingston, David Martin, Bruno Simma, and Eric
Stein also provided careful, critical readings of an earlier draft of the essay.
1. LEON GORDENKER, REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 125 (1987).
2. James C. Hathaway, Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection, 4 J. REFU-
GEE STUD. 113, 113-14 (1991).
3. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 290-302 (2d ed. 1962).
4. This is not to say that the world lives up to its motto, but it is precisely those situations in
which the actual deviates from the ideal that present such deep problems for the international
regime (e.g., the Palestinians and the Vietnamese boat people in Hong Kong).
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naturalization-dutifully reinforce the notion of state control over
membership decisions.
Refugees, however, represent a failure of the state system, a "prob-
lem" to be "solved." As "involuntary migrants,"'5 refugees evidence a
breach of the relationship between the citizen and the state-of-origin,
calling into question the legitimacy of a system that, in practice, rele-
gates people to the largely unfettered exercise of sovereignty of a state
over its citizens. 6 The acts of the country of origin, then, constitute an
injury to both the refugee and other states. The existence of refugees,
and the weight of their moral claim to protection, also put pressure on
a basic premise of international law that state sovereignty entails ple-
nary power to determine admissions policies. Yet affirmation of the
authority of states to exclude refugees may well leave the refugee vir-
tually stateless, unable to enter a country of asylum, and unable or
unwilling to return to the country of origin. The result appears to be a
logical contradiction: "solution" of the "refugee problem" within the
existing system of states threatens a first principle (state control over
admissions) of that system.
This paper will explore the international regime of refugee law,
seeking to show how legal "solutions" to the "refugee problem" are
profoundly state-centered. I will argue that discussions of "solutions"
in refugee law and policy have taken a dramatic turn in recent years,
replacing an exilic bias with a source-control bias. This new orienta-
tion focuses attention on countries of origin, supporting repatriation
and human rights monitoring before and after return. I suggest that
the shift in emphasis, albeit grounded in part in humanitarian con-
cerns, presents real risks when realized within a system committed to
the protection of human rights in theory more than practice. Ulti-
mately, source-control measures may end up being more about contain-
ment of migration than about improved protection of refugees. I will
also argue that the state-centeredness of legal discourse has shown dis-
turbingly little concern for the actual experiences and desires of refu-
gees themselves. Whether, and how, the voices of refugees can find a
place in the conceptualization of refugee law remains a task for the
future.
I. STATES AND REFUGEES
From a sociological perspective, refugees are most broadly concep-
5. See infra part I.
6. Joseph H. Carens, States and Refugee" A Normative Analysis, in REFUGEE POLICY:
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 18, 23 (Howard Adelman ed., 1991).
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tualized as involuntary migrants-persons forced to leave their habit-
ual place of residence because of conditions that make life there
intolerable. The causes of flight may be human-made (persecution,
civil disorder, and economic crisis) or acts of nature (floods and
droughts). Some scholars have suggested narrower definitions, 7 but
what is significant about the social science conceptualizations is that
notions of statehood, sovereignty, and boundaries play subsidiary roles
in defining persons in need of assistance (although any complete analy-
sis of causes and solutions could not be wholly indifferent to the forms
and structures of political power).
The legal concept of refugee, on the other hand, is closely related
to understandings of the state, state sovereignty, and state member-
ship. The earliest notions of sanctuary and asylum followed directly
from the idea of a polity having exclusive sovereignty over specified
territory: when an individual fled from his or her native land to an-
other country, presence in the receiving state offered protection be-
cause the country of origin could make no claim that its laws could
control within the territory of another state. 8
The situation of millions of displaced persons after both world
wars, coupled with a new emphasis on human rights protection, sup-
plied a humanitarian basis for emerging international refugee law
norms, but the legal thinking remained state-centered. Refugee status
was predicated on the requirement that a person be outside his or her
country of origin and that he or she be without the protection afforded
by state membership (where "protection" was understood not to refer
to assistance, but rather to the acquisition of a legal status).9 Clearly,
persons who had been denationalized, and were therefore stateless,
qualified. But postwar humanitarianism expanded the circle to in-
clude the de facto stateless as well: persons whose bonds with their
societies had been so disrupted, such as victims of persecution, that
they had been effectively denied protection by their home countries.10
The legal concept of refugee was rendered concrete in the 1951
Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees."I The Conven-
7. See, e.g., ARISTICLE R. ZOLBERG ET AL., ESCAPE FROM VIOLENCE: CONFLICT AND THE
REFUGEE CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 29-33, 269-72 (1989) (focusing on "violence" as
a cause for flight).
8. David Kennedy, International Refugee Protection, 8 HUM. RTs. Q. 1, 23-25 (1986).
9. Interestingly, the earliest international measures sought to provide refugees with travel
documents (in lieu of a national passport that their situation made unavailable to them). Atle
Grahl-Madsen, Protection of Refugees in International Law, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 362, 373
(1986).
10. Id.
11. More than one hundred states have ratified the Convention, which is considered the
foundation of modern international refugee law today. Ivor C. Jackson, The 1951 Convention
[V/ol. 14:120
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tion was drafted to deal with the situation of post-World War II Eu-
rope, where millions of persons found themselves outside their
countries of origin and unable or unwilling to return. It defined "refu-
gee" as a person who:
As a result of events occurring before 1 January, 1951 and owing to [a]
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or
who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his for-
mer habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to return to it.12
The definition is quite clearly based on the idea that a refugee is some-
one who has lost the protection of his or her state, is now located
outside that state, and is in need of a new guarantee of protection.
That is, the "problem" to be solved is the de jure or de facto loss of
membership, as measured by the likelihood of persecution on the spec-
ified grounds. In his classic treatise, Professor Grahl-Madsen explains
the Convention's concept of refugee this way:
[I]t is characteristic of the situation of political refugees that the normal
mutual bond of trust, loyalty, protection, and assistance between an indi-
vidual and the government of his home country has been broken (or
simply does not exist) in their case, and that they are afraid of returning
to that country lest they shall have to make a complete political submis-
sion to a government which they consider repugnant and maybe also
"illegal." 13
Similarly, Hathaway argues that the status of refugee is based on a
notion of "disfranchisement or breakdown of basic membership
rights.. .. ,14 Refugees are distinguishable from other persons "at risk
relating to the Status of Refugees: A Universal Basis for Protection, 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 403,
407 (1992).
12. Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. l(A)(2) [herein-
after Geneva Convention]. The Convention also included in the definition of refugee persons
who had been considered refugees under earlier international agreements. Id. art. I(A)(1).
13. 1 ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 79
(1966).
14. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 135 (1991). See also Andrew E.
Shacknove, Who Is a Refugee?, 95 ETHics 274, 277 (1985) ("It is [the] absence of state protection
which constitutes the full and complete negation of society and the basis of refugeehood.").
It is intriguing that a concept that appears so directly linked to humanitarian concerns none-
theless is explained in membership terms. This demonstrates the hold that state-centeredness has
on refugee law scholarship. Furthermore, it seems to me that the dominant metaphor said to
underlie the notion of refugeehood-a "severed social bond"-is not up to the task. Societies
and social relations are far too complex for any easy statement of when a person has experienced
the "full and complete negation of society." Refugees usually flee before this point is reached,
and ;ecognition as a refugee does not demand such a showing of complete negation. For exam-
ple, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' Handbook on Procedures and Criteria
for Determining Refugee Status states that discriminatory measures against a person or group
may constitute "persecution" if they "lead to consequences of a substantially prejudicial nature
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of serious harm" because "[tjheir position within the home commu-
nity is not just precarious" but also accompanied by "an element of
fundamental marginalization.... ."15
Although refugee status is grounded in the idea of loss of member-
ship, refugee law does not guarantee attainment of membership else-
where. Recognizing the fundamental international law norm that
states have complete control over the entrance of aliens into their terri-
tory, 16 the Convention carefully fails to establish any duty upon states
to admit refugees. 17 Its central protection is the guarantee of non-
refoulement-the right of refugees not to be returned to a country in
which they would suffer persecution. 18 Subsequent attempts to con-
clude an international treaty on territorial asylum have failed. 19
Furthermore, the Convention neither mandates that states adopt
procedures for refugee status determinations nor does it create an in-
ternational body to make such decisions. It also fails to establish any
formal reporting requirements or monitoring devices for investigating
state compliance. Thus, the adjudication of who is a refugee-upon
which all the protections of the Convention turn-is left entirely to
state authorities.
for the person concerned, e.g. serious restrictions on his right to earn a livelihood, his right to
practice his religion, or his access to normally available educational facilities." U.N. HIGH
COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING
REFUGEE STATUS, para. 54 (1979). Clearly these kinds of deprivations, even if systematic and
severe, fall far short of the severing of social bonds; indeed, the phrase sometimes used to de-
scribe these measures---"second-class citizenship"-implicitly suggests that some form of tie to
the state and society still exists. (We could develop measures of deprivation and construct a scale
that identifies particularly egregious deprivations as constituting evidence of dissolution of the
social bond. But then the "social bond" metaphor provides no explanatory power; it is merely
the conclusion we attach to inflictions of injury that are generally considered intolerable.)
15. HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 135.
16. But see James A.R. Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens Under International Law,
77 AM. J. INT'L L. 804 (1983). Of course, control over entry does not mean that aliens whom the
state chooses to admit are without rights, either under domestic or international law. See gener-
ally RICHARD B. LILLICH, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1984) (suggesting that the traditional nation-state approach to protecting the
rights of aliens no longer applies to contemporary international law).
17. And for those refugees whom states admit, the Convention imposes no duty to permit
their naturalization; rather, in precatory language, it states "States shall as far as possible facili-
tate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees." Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 34.
18. Even this fundamental principle yields to state interests. Article 33(2) provides that pro-
tectibn against non-refoulement does not extend to "a refugee whom there are reasonable
grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having
been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the
community of that country." Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 33(2). See also Kay Hail-
bronner, Non-Refoulement and 'Humanitarian" Refugees: Customary International Law or
Wishful Legal Thinking?, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 857, 866 (1986) ("[T]he non-refoulement provision
of the [Geneva] Convention indicates that states do not lightly divest themselves of their right to
control their borders, a fundamental aspect of state sovereignty.").
19. See, e.g., ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, TERRITORIAL ASYLUM (1980).
State-Centered Refugee Law
In a deep way, therefore, the Convention fails to solve the problem
that refugee status poses for the state system. The premise of state
control of its borders blocks recognition of a right to asylum, yet the
humanitarian norm of non-refoulement bars return of a refugee to a
place where he or she would suffer persecution. It should hardly be
surprising, then, to find literally millions of refugees around the world
languishing in "temporary" arrangements, not forced to return to
their countries of origin but denied permanent resettlement in coun-
tries of asylum. 20
II. STATE-CENTERED "SOLuTIONS": FROM EXILIC BIAS TO
SOURCE-CONTROL BIAS
It is commonly said that there are three "durable solutions" for
refugees: voluntary return to their countries of origin, settlement in
the country of asylum, and resettlement in a third country.21 The un-
derlying reasoning is straight-forward. If refugee status constitutes
dissolution of "social bonds," then unmaking refugees demands the
creation or reestablishment of "social bonds"-either in the country of
origin or elsewhere.22 In short, a durable solution repairs the tear in
the state system fabric by ensuring that no individual lacks member-
ship in some state.
For roughly three decades following adoption of the Convention, it
was generally assumed that external settlement of refugees was the du-
rable solution of choice. This view-which Coles labels the "exilic
bias" of refugee law23-reflected geopolitical realities (World War II
refugees would not be asked to return home), Cold War doctrine (the
West scored ideological points by welcoming refugees from the East),
and Eurocentric humanitarianism (surely refugees were better off if
they could settle in the civilized, developed West). As long as the
20. See generally David A. Martin, The Refugee Concept' On Definitions, Politics, and the
Careful Use of a Scarce Resource, in REFUGEE POLICY: CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 30
(Howard Adelman ed., 1991) (suggesting that most forced migrants in developed states end up
with de facto asylum because, whether or not they are determined to meet the Convention's
definition of refugee, few are ever returned).
21. Barry N. Stein, The Nature of the Refugee Problem, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PRO-
TECTION OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 50 (Alan E. Nash ed., 1988).
22. The goal of reestablishment of the social bond is not usually stated in "membership"
terms. To so characterize the goal would be a move toward recognition of a "right to asylum,"
which would undermine the premise that states have unfettered authority to determine admis-
sions policies. The careful hedging here is evident in Article 34 of the Convention, enjoining
contracting states to "as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees."
Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 34.
23. Gervase J.L. Coles, The Human Rights Approach to the Solution of the Refugee Problem:
A Theoretical and Practical Enquiry, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 195, 209 (Alan E. Nash ed., 1988).
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numbers of refugees remained small, governments could proclaim gen-
erous policies of asylum. Legal advocates for refugees, too, contrib-
uted to the exilic bias, urging expansive programs of resettlement and
broad interpretations of the Convention's definition of refugees. The
idea that refugees would seek return to their native lands-at least any
time soon-seemed almost inconceivable.
In the past decade or so, we have witnessed the breakdown of the
exilic approach to refugee law. A legal regime constructed to handle
the problems of European refugees already settled in European coun-
tries of asylum (and individual East bloc "defectors") began to witness
mass flows of refugees in the Third World and large numbers of asy-
lum-seekers arriving in Western developed nations from the Third
World and former communist states in Eastern Europe. Short-term
assistance to refugees in countries of first asylum began to look more
long-term, as few refugees received offers of permanent resettlement
from the developed world.24 Moreover, because it was believed that
many of those displaced over national boundaries were not "true" ref-
ugees (that is, did not meet the rather narrow criteria of the Conven-
tion), the need for permanent resettlement seemed less clear; once the
political violence ceased, innocent victims who had not been targeted
before flight could return to pick up their lives where they had left off.
And, as recent events in Eastern Europe and Afghanistan demon-
strate, even targeted individuals may be able to return following a
change in regime.
Resettlement was challenged on consequentialist grounds as well.
The exilic bias was said to unjustiflably relieve countries of origin of
responsibility to their citizens and other states burdened by refugee
flows, to undermine a refugee's right to seek the support of the inter-
national community in obtaining safe return, and to institutionalize
exile at the expense of the fundamental right to return to one's home
country.25
24. The lack of resettlement opportunities is startling. The High Commissioner for Refugees
reported last year that, of the 15 million global refugees in 1990, the UNHCR requested resettle-
ment for just under 150,000, and of these, the Office registered only 52,000 departures. The
report noted that the major reason for the low level of resettlement was the limited number of
countries offering annual refugee admission quotas (only 10 of the 159 members of the United
Nations establish and announce annual refugee resettlement quotas). EXECUTIVE COMMITEE
OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER'S PROGRAMME, SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE ON INTERNA-
TIONAL PROTECTION, RESETTLEMENT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF PROTECTION, U.N. Doc. EP/
SCP/65 (1991). See also Robert L. Bach, Third Country Resettlement, in REFUGEES AND IN-
TERNATIONAL RELATIONS 313, 317-22 (Gil Loescher & Laila Monahan eds., 1989).
25. There are counter-arguments here, however, which must be taken seriously: in today's
world, most returns are to areas still involved in civil strife or serious rights abuses; policies of
host countries often make returns less than fully voluntary; the UNHCR and non-governmental
organizations lack resources and access to effectively monitor human rights protections for re-
turnees; and focusing on repatriation undercuts assistance efforts and may lead to a watering
[V/oi. 14:120
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These pragmatically based considerations were supported by theo-
retical developments, as arguments grounded in both liberal and com-
munitarian perspectives began to challenge the traditional case for
resettlement. From a liberal, human rights approach, the fundamental
wrong done to refugees was a denial of their right to live freely in their
home countries. Furthermore, forced exile violated the internationally
recognized right of citizens to return to their countries of origin.
From this perspective, resettlement can never be the primary remedy
because it does not restore the right; rather, the "basic solution" must
solve the problem of the denial of freedoms attending exile, either by
preventing the conditions that compel ffight or remedying those condi-
tions after flight.26 Preference for resettlement, it may also be argued,
fails to appreciate the importance of ties of persons to organic commu-
nities in which they resided prior to flight. Lawyers may be able to
conceive of membership as a legal status that may be easily shed and
acquired. But human beings do not so effortlessly cast off a sense of
belonging, roots, and ties to the land of one's ancestors (a sociological
conception of membership). These communitarian considerations
would favor a solution of repatriation, so that refugees can reestablish
themselves within the social setting that is constitutive of their sense of
self.27
i Shrinking hopes of resettlement, combined with these theoretical
considerations, have produced a fundamental rethinking of "solu-
tions" to the refugee problem, with voluntary repatriation now consid-
ered the preferred durable solution.28 Thus, in 1980, the Executive
down of the refugee definition. Barbara E. Harrell-Bond, Repatriation: Under What Conditions
Is It the Most Desirable Solution for Refugees? An Agenda for Research, 32 Ai. STUD. REv. 41,
44-45 (1989); Barry N. Stein, Policy Challenges Regarding Repatriation in the 1990s: Is 1992
the Year for Voluntary Repatriation? (1992) (on fie with the Michigan Journal of International
Law); Gervase J.L. Coles, Approaching the Refugee Problem Today, in REFUGEES AND INTER-
NATIONAL RELATIONS 373, 391 (Gil Loescher & Laila Monahan eds., 1989).
26. According to Coles, "external settlement" can constitute a permissible solution only
when (1) the basic solution is not possible, and (2) the refugee freely acquires the nationality of
another country and enjoys the protection of that country. Coles, supra note 23, at 201.
27. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Voluntary Repatriation: Legal and Policy Issues, in REFUGEES
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 255, 270 (Gil Loescher & Laila Monahan eds., 1989) ("Re-
turn is the objective to which international law aspires; it derives from the conception of national-
ity in international law, being coterminous with the notions of attachment and belonging ... ").
But see Bach, supra note 24, at 314 (arguing that repatriation is not a return home, but rather "a
process of creating a new home" in a changed society).
28. New focus has also been placed on making settlement in countries of first asylum more
secure and permanent through policies of development-oriented assistance which seek to help
refugees become self-sufficient in host communities. Executive Committee of the UNHCR Pro-
gramme, 36th Sess., Conclusion no. 40 (1985) [hereinafter Conclusion no. 40]; Barry N. Stein,
Refugee Aid and Development7 Slow Progress Since ICARA II, in REFUGEE POLICY: CANADA
AND THE UNITED STATES 143, 156-57 (Howard Adelman ed., 1991); Jacques Cuenod, Refugees:
Development or Reliefi, in REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 219, 240-42 (Gil Loe-
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Committee of the UNHCR Programme adopted a resolution stating
that "voluntary repatriation constitutes generally... the most appro-
priate solution for refugee problems" 29-a conclusion it reaffirmed five
years later, noting "[t]he basic rights of persons to return voluntarily
to the country of origin" and urging that "international co-operation
be aimed at achieving this solution and should be further devel-
oped."' 30 The 1980s witnessed massive returns of refugees; large num-
bers of Mozambicans, Afghans, Ugandans, Salvadorans, Kurds,
Ethiopians, and Nicaraguans went home (under varying kinds of ar-
rangements with varying degrees of coercion). Thus in 1991, UN
High Commissioner for Refugees Ogata could proclaim that 1992
would be "the year for voluntary repatriation. '31
The real-world conditions that precipitated the new thinking about
durable solutions also led the international community to focus atten-
tion on ways to prevent mass refugee flows from occurring. The rea-
soning here is that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of remedy.
One obvious solution-simply closing borders-was rejected as an im-
permissible abridgment of the principle of non-refoulement (although
the U.S. interdiction and return of Haitian boat people is an example
of a flagrant violation of international law). 32 But refugee flows could
scher & Laila Monahan eds., 1989). For a powerful critique, see BARBARA E. HARRELL-BOND,
IMPOSING AID: EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES 7-8 (1986).
29. Executive Committee of the UNHCR Programme, Conclusion no. 18, 31st Sess. (1980).
30. Conclusion no. 40, supra note 28.
31. See also UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, NOTE ON INTERNA-
TIONAL PROTECTION 10, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/777 (1991) [hereinafter UNHCR 1991 Report]
("Voluntary repatriation is the most desirable of all durable solutions to the refugee problem, and
remains a priority for UNHCR within the context of the limited resources available to the Of-
fice.").
The head-long rush towards repatriation needs some careful scrutiny. As has been recently
argued by Barry Stein:
[T]he conventional wisdom regarding repatriation is wrong and activities based upon it are
likely to be irrelevant at best or harmful and wasteful at worst....
A new "conventional wisdom" regarding voluntary repatriation needs to recognize that
most repatriation is refugee-induced and occurs under conditions of conflict. In many situa-
tions "repatriation" is the wrong term, because there has been no restoration of the bond
between citizen and fatherland.... Similarly, "voluntary" is suspect, because far too many
refugees go home under pressure or threat or to flee attacks by host elements in their coun-
try of asylum.
Stein, supra note 25, at 1-2.
32. Cf. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992) (President
Bush's order mandating return of Haitian boat-people violates § 243(h) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, which provides protection co-extensive with Article 33 of the Geneva Conven-
tion).
The case for policies of "pushback," "interdiction," and (the Orwellian sounding) "humani-
tarian deterrence" can be made only upon the (unrealistic) assumption that all persons so de-
terred do not come within the Convention's definition of refugee or that processing in the
country of origin is a viable alternative (perhaps true in the former Soviet Union, but not in
Haiti).
[V/ol. 14:120
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be staunched, it was argued, by undertaking efforts to ameliorate the
"sroot causes" of mass flight across borders. In 1981 the U.N. General
Assembly, expressing "grave concern" over the "continuing massive
flows of refugees in many parts of the world," established a Group of
Governmental Experts charged with producing a report on "Interna-
tional Co-Operation to Avert New Flows of Refugees."' 33 The report,
issued in 1986, identifies a number of political, socio-economic and
natural causes of mass flows. It not unsensibly recommends that states
"refrain from creating or contributing by their policies" to causes of
such flows by respecting human rights, non-discrimination norms, and
international law.34 Efforts at removing root causes, it was suggested,
could also be aided by the establishment of "early warning" monitor-
ing mechanisms that could identify for the source country and the in-
ternational community conditions likely to produce flows of refugees
in the near future. 35
So far, the discussion has concerned theoretical developments at
the international level. But it should be apparent that the exilic bias
has also lost its appeal to most of the governments of the developed
West. The reasons are complicated and varied, but surely include (1)
a sharp rise in the number of asylum-seekers (estimates for Germany
this year top 350,000), which has produced virulent antialien move-
ments in Europe; (2) cultural differences between refugees and their
host countries; (3) large increases in outlays for refugee support pro-
grams and adjudication procedures 36; and (4) an end to the Cold War,
which removed the ideological attractiveness of liberal resettlement
policies.37 These developments have led Western states to view the
"refugee problem" as triggering not humanitarian concern, but rather
policies of control and deterrence. States, as matters of domestic law,
have adopted narrow readings of the Convention's definition of refu-
33. G.A. Res. 36/148, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 91, U.N. Doc. A/36/51
(1981). See also Sadruddin Aga Khan, Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms in any Part of the World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and Other De-
pendent Countries and Territories" Study on Human Rights and Massive Exoduses, U.N.
ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 38th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1503 (1981).
34. The Report, which is short on specific recommendations, clearly reflects a compromise
between developed and developing nations: states are called upon to refrain from domestic poli-
cies that create refugees and to abide by principles of non-intervention whose violation is "partic-
ularly prone" to cause new massive flows of refugees. Luke T. Lee, Toward a World without
Refugees: The United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on International Co-Operation to
Avert New Flows of Refugees, 1986 BRrT. Y.B. INT'L L. 317, 322.
35. GORDENKER, supra note 1, at 174-77.
36. Hathaway reports that developed states currently spend between $5 and $8 billion a year
on refugee determination schemes, more than ten times the annual budget of UNHCR.
Hathaway, supra note 2, at 129.
37. David A. Martin, The New Asylum Seekers, in THE NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE
LAW IN THE 1980s I (David A. Martin ed., 1988).
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gee, established policies of detention of asylum-seekers, instituted new
visa controls, and sought to impose sanctions on carriers who trans-
port asylum-seekers. Serious proposals have been made to amend the
German Constitution, which alone among Western constitutions guar-
antees a right of asylum. And measures are currently being drafted
that seek a united European approach to adjudicating asylum claims. 38
Refugee law has become immigration law, emphasizing protection of
borders rather than protection of persons.
The international preference for voluntary repatriation and con-
cern with root causes, coupled with deterrent measures adopted by
states, have produced a dramatic shift in the focus of refugee law and
policy. As resettlement possibilities become more remote and "tempo-
rary" arrangements become depressingly long-term, primary attention
is now being directed to the countries of origin of refugee flows. In
short, in the past decade the exilic bias has been superseded by a
source-control bias.
III. A RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE PREMISES
OF REFUGEE LAW?
Does the move from an exilic bias to a source-control strategy indi-
cate a fundamental shift in the premises of refugee law? From one
view, the new bias remains profoundly state-centered. The deterrent
policies of the West are quite clearly attempts to stop the kinds of
movements of people that create practical and theoretical problems for
the state system. And a preference for repatriation-whether or not
conceptualized in human rights terms-is grounded in restoring the
citizen to his or her state. 39 Facilitating the return of refugees removes
the challenge to the sovereignty of the receiving states that the human-
itarian claims of refugees inevitably pose. Indeed, once states invoke
their sovereign right not to resettle refugees-an exercise of power, it
should be recalled, not condemned by the Convention-then repatria-
38. Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum
Lodged in One of the Member States of the European Communities, June 15, 1990, reprinted in 2
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 469 (1990); Convention on the Application of the Schengen Agreement of
14 June 1985 relating to the Gradual Suppression of Controls at Common Frontiers, between the
Governments of States Members of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and the French Republic, June 19, 1990, tit. II, ch.7, reprinted in 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L.
773, 780-86 (1991); Treaty on European Unity, Feb. 7, 1992, tit. VI, 311. L. M. 253, 327 (1992),
and Declaration on Asylum, id. at 373; David A. Martin, Restrictive Practices Affecting Asylum
Seekers: A Preliminary Report 8 (1992) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the Committee
on the Legal Status of Refugees of the International Law Association; on file with the Michigan
Journal of International Law); lain Guest, The United Nations, UNHCR, and Refugee Protection:
A Non-Specialist Analysis, 3 IN'L J. REFUGEE L. 585, 597 (1991).
39. Development-oriented assistance also seeks to further community attachment.
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tion becomes the only viable durable solution. 40
Interventionist strategies in countries of origin aimed at ameliorat-
ing root causes of flight or guaranteeing safe return may be more diffi-
cult to place within the conventional model of sovereign states.
Traditionally, refugee law has dealt with the sending states as it found
them: refugees were persons outside their countries of origin, and re-
ceiving states either chose to admit them or send them to a third coun-
try. Only persons who could not meet the standards for establishing
refugee status were returned home; and because returnees did not
come within the protection of the Convention, refugee law stopped at
the border of the home country.
With a little ingenuity, a source-control model can be explained as
consistent with a state-centered approach premised on the notion of
equal and independent states. First, as noted by the Group of Govern-
mental Experts, mass flight "may affect the political and social stabil-
ity, as well as the economic development, of the receiving States,.and
also carry adverse consequences for the economies of the countries of
origin and entire regions, thus endangering international peace and se-
curity.' ' 41 On this account, the creation of refugees may be character-
ized as an offense against the system of states warranting remedial
measures by the international community.42 State abuse of its citizens
also produces problems for the state system as a whole because it
threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the state system by calling
into question the justness of the principle that assigns citizens to states
and states to citizens. 43 In other words, the recognition of a state's
sovereignty by the community of states could be deemed to be predi-
cated upon the humane treatment of the citizens assigned to the state
by the state system. Thus, interventionist efforts to protect human
rights or civil order would be a permissible infringement on state sov-
ereignty if it could be reasonably justified in system maintenance
terms.
On the other hand, source-control strategies might be viewed as a
dramatic reformulation of refugee law, replacing an emphasis on states
and membership with a humanitarianism concerned with persons, not
40. Other suggestions by commentators, while innovative, likewise reaffirm state-centered-
ness. See, eg., Jack I. Garvey, Toward a Reformulation of International Refugee Law, 26 HARv.
INT'L L. J. 483 (1985) (state responsibility); Hathaway, supra note 2, at 124 (international efforts
to achieve resettlement by appealing to self-interest of states).
41. Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on International Co-operation to Avert
New Flows of Refugees [hereinafter Report], U.N.GAOR 41st Sess., Prelim. List Item 78, at 16,
U.N. Doc. A/41/324 (1986).
42. See Garvey, supra note 40.
43. See Carens, supra note 6; Hathaway, supra note 2.
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borders. The theoretical groundwork for a paradigm shift has begun.
Hathaway has proposed conceptualizing the definition of refugee in
human rights terms;44 and Coles has suggested a human rights ap-
proach to solutions. 45 Demands that states respect the human rights
of their citizens in order to prevent refugee flows may more easily be
characterized as concerned with the welfare of human beings than
with maintenance of the state system.
International practice may also be interpreted as moving in such a
direction. Under recent repatriation arrangements, the UNHCR has
agreed to accompany the refugees back and monitor their protection
after return (certainly a role unanticipated by the drafters of the Con-
vention).46 The creation of a safety zone for Kurds in Iraq following
the Gulf War represents the zenith of intrusions into the sovereignty
of refugee-producing nations and has reinvigorated the debate on hu-
manitarian intervention. 47
The implications of a paradigm shift would be considerable. Re-
placing state-centeredness with a robust humanitarianism would call
into question the Convention's definition of refugee, which covers only
a small portion of involuntary migrants. Refugee law, under such an
account, would be grounded on a "principle of refuge" 48 that seeks to
ameliorate the suffering of all those forced to leave their home coun-
tries. The new paradigm would also put significant pressure on the
requirement that a person be "outside the country of his [or her] na-
tionality" to qualify as a refugee. From a human rights perspective,
the internally displaced are at least as needy (and perhaps more vul-
nerable) than those who have managed to flee across national bor-
ders.49 Indeed, it may be those who are unable to flee who are most in
44. Hathaway, supra note 2.
45. See Coles, supra note 23; Coles, supra note 25.
46. Development assistance for returnees also aids the local population. LAWYERS COMMIT-
TEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, UNCERTAIN HAVEN: REFUGEE PROTECTION ON THE FORTIETH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE 1951 UNITED NATIONS REFUGEE CONVENTION 156 (1991); Guest,
supra note 38.
47. James A.R. Nafziger, Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention in a Commu-
nity of Power, 20 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL. 9, 30-31 (1991); Howard Adelman, Humanitarian
Intervention: The Case of the Kurds, 4 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 4 (1992).
48. The phrase is Goodwin-Gill's:
The "principle of refuge" is used here to signify the multifaceted duty to accord aid to those
in distress, varied though its content may be. In the present context it covers, in particular,
refugees in both [a] broad and narrow [sense] ... ; those in danger of torture if returned; or
[those] who face serious discrimination; or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. But the
principle is potentially much wider; a priori, it does not exclude the shipwrecked, the victim
of natural disaster, the conscientious objector or the deserter. What the law has yet to do is
to contribute to the next generation of answers.
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Language of Protection, 1 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 6, 15 & n.43 (1989).
49. Sadruddin Aga Khan, Looking Into the 1990s: Afghanistan and Other Refugee Crises,
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 14, 26-27 (Spec. Issue, 1990).
[Vol. 14:120
State-Centered Refugee Law
need of assistance. At this point, refugee law would collapse into
human rights law, and the shift would be complete. The possibility
that refugee law could do serious human rights work in countries of
origins helps account for the current political strength of the prefer-
ence for repatriation. Both human rights advocates and governments
of countries of asylum-for very different reasons--can support poli-
cies of return.50
Whether the new emphasis on source-control strategies represents
a corollary of a state-centered approach or instead constitutes move-
ment towards a new paradigm may ultimately be a moot question if
practical politics in the real world block serious efforts at breaching
the borders of the states of origin. I fear this is likely to be the case.
The work of legal scholars to the contrary notwithstanding, state au-
thorities charged with interpreting and implementing the Convention
hardly appear interested in expanding the Convention's definition of
refugee.51 As to the willingness of states to take measures in states of
origins to prevent refugee flows, consider the statement in the report of
the Group of Experts that "the task of averting massive flows of refu-
gees requires improved international co-operation at all levels ... in
full observance of the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs
of sovereign states."5 2 In this respect, the unwillingness of European
nations to intervene in the former Yugoslavia, which has created more
than two million refugees, may represent the norm to which the inter-
vention in Iraq on behalf of Kurds is the rare exception.
Furthermore, the empirical evidence on repatriations is decidedly
mixed. As Cuny and Stein note, "[i]n the literature on voluntary repa-
triation the assertion that voluntary repatriation is the 'most desirable'
durable solution is often closely followed by pessimistic evaluations of
its prospects. '5 3 While some repatriations have been successful, these
are usually in states in which the refugee-creating conflicts have ended,
either by way of a regime change or a cease fire.54 Most recent repatri-
50. This is not to say that refugee advocates approve of deterrent measures adopted by re-
ceiving states. They clearly do not, given the serious risk that such measures deter bona fide
asylum seekers and make no attempt to guarantee protection in the country of origin. See B. S.
Chimni, Perspectives on Voluntary Repatriation: A Critical Note, 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 541
(1991); Coles, supra note 23, at 216-18.
51. See, eg., I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S.Ct. 812 (1992).
52. Report, supra note 41, at 16 (emphasis supplied).
53. Fred Cuny & Barry N. Stein, Prospects for and Promotion of Spontaneous Repatriation, in
REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONs 293 (Gil Loescher & Laila Monahan eds., 1989).
54. Two examples would be Namibian repatriations following independence in 1990, and
Chilean returns following the fall of Pinochet. See also Stein, supra note 25; UNHCR 1991
Report, supra note 31.
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ations, however, have occurred within the context of continuing civil
disorder; and the ability of international organizations to ensure the
security of the returnees has been sorely tested. 55 Certainly, the early
news from Cambodia is cause for considerable concern. It appears
that state sovereignty is more easily transcended in theory than
practice.
Rather than a paradigm shift, then, we may well be witnessing the
troubling use of a humanitarian discourse to mask a reaffirmation of
state-centeredness. 56 That is, the emphasis on repatriation and root
causes will help developed states justify the new strategies adopted to
"solve" their asylum "crises," yet deeply entrenched practices of non-
intervention will prevent serious measures to improve human rights
situations in countries of origin. If this analysis is correct, then the
story of change is not about the melding of refugee law into human
rights law; rather, it is the exchange of an exilic bias for policies of
containment--detention of asylum seekers, visa requirements, closing
opportunities for resettlement, pushbacks, and return. These policies
are grounded less in a desire to breach the walls of state sovereignty
than an attempt to keep Third World refugee problems from inconve-
niencing the developed states. The significant risk here is that a poli-
tics of containment will have the ugly result of abandoning refugees to
the very states from which they fled in search of assistance and protec-
tion. If this is so, then refugee advocates who see recent repatriation
efforts as vehicles for doing human rights work within the sending
countries may be unwitting allies in reinforcing the very state-centered
model they seek to overthrow.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE VOICES OF REFUGEES
If the preceding analysis is correct, then refugee scholars and advo-
cates would do well to stay off the repatriation bandwagon until there
are far stronger reasons to believe that the international regime stands
ready and able to keep its human rights commitments to returnees and
other victims of persecution.
Other proposals worth investigating include non-source control
strategies that both avoid the current problems plaguing resettlement
efforts and appeal to the self-interest of states. For example, Garvey
suggests that norms of state responsibility be invoked to hold sending
55. Two recent cases involve the UNHCR's continuing assistance to masivas in Salvador,
and the short-lived nature of Tamil repatriation.
56. Or, as Eric Stein has suggested to me, a use of humanitarian talk to mask the pursuit of
an interventionist foreign policy.
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states liable to countries of asylum. 57 And Hathaway has proposed an
internationalized burden-sharing scheme that would strike "a reason-
able accommodation between the inevitability of special claims [of ref-
ugees] and the sovereignty of states." 58
Another alternative that neither concedes the field to unbridled
state power nor simply appeals to pie-in-the-sky humanitarianism
might focus on developing strategies at the intra-regional level through
collaboration of countries of origin and countries of asylum.59 Such
efforts include expanded definitions of "refugee" (under the Organiza-
tion of African Unity Convention and the Cartagena Declaration) and
multilateral security and repatriation arrangements (International
Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA)).6° Regional
approaches, based on shared cultural and historical perspectives, may
be able to tolerate a kind of flexibility in approach and ambiguity in
status not usually deemed appropriate for universal instruments and
arrangements. 61 Interventionist strategies may also appear less threat-
ening when carried out in the name of intra-regional norms rather
than universal principles enforced by powerful states outside the
region.
Finally, it would be wise to bring the knowledge, experience and
goals of refugees to bear on the search for alternatives. Legal scholars
have generally written from a state-centered perspective, betraying a
preoccupation with questions of membership that may or may not be
in the best interest of refugees. Lawyers, like states, find the idea of
persons unattached to political communities problematic, because
such membership is believed to be the only basis for secure possession
and protection of rights. Thus legal academics in the developed states
have primarily focused their attention on obtaining some form of
membership for refugees who have made their way to the West. Tem-
porary protection devices (such as the European "B" status or the
U.S. "temporary protected status") are seen as acceptable only when
domestic politics makes full membership impossible or when it is clear
57. Garvey, supra note 40. As Hathaway notes, Garvey's solution might lead to an increase
in human rights abuses if states of origin take efforts to prevent escape of the persecuted in order
to reduce liability to countries of asylum. Hathaway, supra note 2, at 119.
58. Hathaway, supra note 2, at 114.
59. Compare James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee
Law, 31 HARV. INT'L L. J. 129, 183 (1990).
60. Roberto Cuellar et a., Refugee and Related Developments in Latin America: Challenges
Ahead, 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 482 (1991); Eduardo Arboleda, Refugee Definition in Africa and
Latin America: The Lessons of Pragmatism, 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 185 (1991).
61. Contrast the willingness of Western European states to provide temporary safe haven to
hundreds of thousands of persons fleeing warfare in the former Yugoslavia and the deterrent
policies imposed by the same states on asylum-seekers from the Third World.
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that those sought to be protected do not come within the Convention
definition.
What is so curious about the membership bias is that it has been
developed (and, in fact, imposed) by the lawyers and the legal system
with little consultation with the refugees themselves. Lawyers seem to
view membership as a coat that can be taken off and replaced rather
than as a constitutive part of identity; 62 and the law's unexamined
preference for membership rarely considers the serious consequences it
poses for refugees-frequently to make return far more difficult and
therefore to officially break ties with family and community in their
countries of origin. In the United States, for example, many forced
migrants apply for official status because they seek work authorization
(not "membership") or because they have been apprehended and
placed in deportation proceedings and seek to forestall return home.
The law, in this fashion, forces refugees to (re)construct their identities
in order to gain the status that the law determines is most appropriate
for them.63 It is at least plausible that refugees might prefer an ambi-
guity and flexibility that does not compel an immediate consideration
of identity questions and that keeps options open for future return or
resettlement.
While I am fairly confident of my characterization of lawyers, I am
quite unsure of my representation of the experiences and objectives of
refugees. To say this is to identify a basic problem with the existing
state-centered model: it has been developed by and for states and law-
yers. Speaking the language of sovereignty and membership, it has
viewed refugees as helpless objects of pity who must be assigned to
some political community in order to have an identity at all (even the
word "protection" suggests a paternalistic relationship between the
powerful protector and the needy protected). 64 Few Western legal
academics have any deep appreciation for, or knowledge of, the refu-
gee experience; yet in an area where they ought to feel ill at ease im-
posing categories and perspectives, they have made themselves the
62. Perhaps the assumption is that since refugees have no membership, they will eagerly
accept membership in a country of resettlement. But this ignores that refugees are involuntary
migrants who may want to maintain membership in their home communities. They are not
immigrants who have chosen to replace one home with another. Rather, they are people who
have been evicted and who are in immediate need of shelter. Whether or not they want to move
their official residence must remain an open question.
63. The asylum application process compels forced migrants to construct themselves to fit
domestic law categories. The process of legal definition seeks a coherent, unambiguous story that
resonates with domestic policy objectives (consider the different treatment that the United States
has accorded asylum-seekers from El Salvador and Nicaragua).
64. See Barbara E. Harrell-Bond, Humanitarianism in a Straitjacket, 84 AFR. AFFAIRS 3
(1985).
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"insiders" by adopting a discourse that keeps the discussions on their
home turf.65
A shift to a humanitarian approach, it should be clear, does not
automatically put the refugees' voices front and center. Indeed, the
power of the humanitarian appeal is precisely that such refugees are
stateless, helpless and voiceless.66
I am suggesting, therefore, that refugee issues might be considered
from the bottom up, with participation by refugees in the definition of
both "the problem" and acceptable "solutions." For instance, it has
been proposed that the tripartite repatriation commissions consisting
of the countries of origin and asylum and the UNHCR be expanded to
include representatives of the repatriating refugees. 67 Interestingly,
the vast majority of refugees who repatriate do so not as a part of an
internationally sponsored effort; rather, they do so on their own. As
Stein notes:
The refugees are the main actors in the contemporary practice of volun-
tary repatriation. They are the main decision-makers and determine the
modalities of movement and the conditions of reception. Refugee-in-
duced repatriation is a self-regulating process on the refugees' own
terms. The refugees apply their own criteria to their situation in exile
and to conditions in their homeland and will return home if it is safe and
better by their standards. Many of the returnees are in desperate cir-
cumstances-in part because their return receives woefully inadequate
international support, but they do not flee again.68
The point here is not that international involvement in repatriation is
unnecessary, but that perhaps the purpose of international assistance
65. Cf. HARRELL-BOND, supra note 28. As a thoughtful and empathic observer of refugee
situations, she nonetheless concedes that "however serious were my efforts to explore a social
process from the insiders' point of view, I was always a spectator and as such I was limited by my
own categories of thought in what I could see." Id. at 25.
Consider, in this regard, the Declaration written at the close of a colloquium of lawyers and
refugee advocates from 25 countries held to mark the 40th Anniversary of Convention. While
the document urges "facilitating the involvement of refugees in the resolution of their problems,"
it makes no specific recommendations on how this might be done. With the lawyers' attention
focused on states, international law, and UNHCR, the refugee is virtually absent from the
document.
66. Consider the telling response of one refugee, invited to participate in an international
conference in England on refugee issues, when asked how refugees would like to be portrayed in
the media: "Why not publicize our energy and our power to help ourselves?" Harrell-Bond,
supra note 64, at 4.
67. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 27, at 284. See also SUSAN FORBES MARTIN, REFUGEE WO-
MEN 72-75 (1991). Cf Arthur C. Helton, The Role of the Refugee, Humanitarian and Human
Rights Law in Planning for the Repatriation of Kampuchean Asylum Seekers in Thailand, 3 INT'L
J. REFUGEE L. 547 (1991). Helton, in an otherwise admirable examination of humanitarian
aspects of the Kampuchean repatriation effort, suggests adding non-governmental organizations
to the tripartite commission. He notes that currently "there is-no systematic involvement of non-
governmental organizations (or refugees) in such arrangements." Id. at 562. The use of a paren-
thetical, I would argue, is a telling indication of the international lawyer's perspective.
68. Stein, supra note 25, at 8.
Fall 19921
Michigan Journal of International Law
should be conceptualized as facilitative (focused on aiding refugees in
effectuating their choices) instead of control-based (helping asylum
countries contain refugee flows). 69 Such an approach, it should be
stressed, would not necessarily adopt a preference for repatriation;
thus it would be skeptical of current arguments that a human rights
approach entails return as the "basic solution."' 70 The definition and
prioritizing of solutions is exactly what should be left open.
Clearly, further research is needed here to inform legal discussions.
In the meantime, legal academics might do well to focus more on the
worlds refugees inhabit and construct and less on membership and
new modalities for international paternalism.
69. The Salvadoran masivas provide an example of refugee-led, UNHCR assisted, return
programs. Patricia Weiss Fagen & Joseph T. Eldridge, Salvadoran Repatriation from Honduras,
in REPATRIATION UNDER CONFLICT IN CENTRAL AMERICA 117, 149-64 (Mary Ann Larkin et
al. eds., 1991). See also Cuny & Stein, supra note 53, at 306 ("[S]pontaneous repatriation restores
a refugee's sense of his own effectiveness and importance, while organized repatriation excludes
refugees from tripartite commissions and gives them little voice in the modalities and conditions
of their return.").
70. Cf. Coles, supra note 23.
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